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Abstract
This paper develops a neoclassical growth model with leisure externalities. 
Ignoring positive (negative) leisure externalities leads to equilibrium consumption, labor 
and capital that are too high (low) and leisure that is too low (high). The government 
should tax (subsidize) labor income according to whether the leisure externality is 
positive or negative. The level of this tax (subsidy) depends on the elasticity of individual 
and average leisure and the consumption tax. Equilibrium dynamics are characterized, 
and two shocks to the economy are analyzed – an increase in the growth rate of labor 
productivity, and an increase in the tax on labor income – by simulating a calibrated 
economy. Adjustment processes of key variables in a competitive and centrally planned
economy with and without leisure externalities are also compared.
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2A growing economic literature is concerned with the effects that average consumption 
has on individual consumption. The phrases “keeping up with the Joneses” and “habit 
formation” are now found everywhere and are symptomatic of this trend. Theoretical 
models were developed to explain some of the asset pricing literature puzzles and the
empirical literature followed to test their implications. However, even though leisure is an 
important component of an individual’s well being and utility function, it has not yet 
generated the same level of interest as average consumption has. Economists are only
paying scant attention to any type of externalities that leisure might provide. 
We argue that there are significant complementarities in the enjoyment of leisure 
at the community level and that leisure can represent one’s social status as much as 
conspicuous consumption does. There is a lot of anecdotal evidence that many of the 
leisure activities are more enjoyable if they are done with others (sports, trips, shopping 
and even watching TV). Using the British Household Panel Survey, Jenkins and Osberg 
(2003) show that spouses synchronize their working time so that they can spend their 
leisure time together. They also show that individuals’ participation in associational 
activity depends on the leisure time and activity of others in their community. 
Hamermesh (2002) and Hunt (1998) found similar effects of working hours 
synchronization between spouses using Unites States and German data respectively. The 
concentration of working hours to 9-5, Monday-Friday, and the tradition of European 
August vacation despite the disadvantages due to crowded infrastructure also show that 
people have a preference to rest when others rest and work when others work. Alesina et 
al. (2005) notice significant differences in labor force participation across demographic 
subgroups within areas and suggest that leisure complementarities is an explaining factor,
along with the tax rates and labor market regulations. They also argue that leisure 
complementarities are an important explanatory factor for the difference in working 
hours in Europe and the US starting in 1970s. In Europe unions managed to impose a 
philosophy of “work less, work all” and reduce the amount of hours worked by each 
individual in the hope that the work will be spread across more workers and reduce the 
unemployment rate. This has lead to the development of a culture where people are used 
to working less and enjoy more leisure even though it has not reached its primal objective 
3of reducing unemployment. The US have not experienced this push towards fewer hours 
and consequently 30 years later the numbers of hours worked per capita decreased by 
about 12% in EU-15, whereas US experienced an increase of about 20% (OECD). 
Alesina et al. (2005) conjectured that leisure complementarities have lead to a “social 
multiplier” that intensified the effects of tax differences in the two regions.
The sociology literature gives significant evidence that along consumption, work 
and leisure are powerful symbols of social status. The amount of leisure of others, more 
specifically the dominant class has an important social status and significant effects on 
the leisure of individuals. This concept can be traced back to Veblen’s Theory of Leisure 
Class (1899).
Throughout most of the human history leisure was the symbol of the dominant 
social status. The dominant class in the feudal system was represented by hunters and 
warriors who thought working the land or in trade was degrading. The middle class men 
(bourgeoisie) who had to work for a living were considered second class and tried to 
assert their status by having at least their wives and daughters in a state of “wasteful 
idleness” (Gershuny 2000).  The use of time in a non productive manner was due to a 
sense of the unworthiness of productive work, and leisure was used as a mean to gain the 
respect of others(Veblen 1899). For the working class the income effect dominated the 
substitution effect, demonstrating once again a preference for leisure. At the beginning of 
the industrial revolution, increasing workers’ salaries had the perverse effect of 
discouraging people from working. Employees worked as much as they needed to earn a 
certain amount of money and spent the rest of their time in a leisurely manner (Schor 
1991, Veal 2004).
Later, the “bored wives” of the 1890s American middle class (Gershuny 2000), or 
even more recently, the housewives of the 1950s were symptomatic of men’s attempt to 
mirror the habits of the upper class by being the sole providers for their families and by
maintaining their wives in a state of at least apparent leisure.
How significant leisure is as a symbol of social status can be measured by
changes in leisure’s perception when leisure habits of the dominant class evolve. At the 
start of the 21st century, work is the new symbol of dominant social status. Rajan and 
Zingales (2003) point out the difference between the “idle rich” of 1929 when 70 percent 
4of the income of the top .01 percent of income earners in the United States came from 
holding of capital and the “working rich” of 1998 when wages and entrepreneurial 
income made up 80 percent of the income of the top .01 percent of income earners in the 
United States. They also notice that in the 1890s the richest 10 percent of the population 
worked fewer hours than the poorest 10 percent, whereas the opposite is true today. Also, 
over the 1961-2001 period, higher human capital groups have increased their work time 
relative to the lower human capital groups from 0.94 (1) to 1.034 (1.094) for men 
(women). A similar pattern applies to Canada, France, the Netherlands, the US (Changing 
times, p. 177, table 7.9). The reason for which higher human capital groups have 
increased their work load is that the industrialization process has continuously increased 
the importance of human capital in the production process. Goldin and Katz (2001) and 
Abramowitz and David (2000) show that the contribution of human capital accumulation 
to the growth process nearly doubled since 1890. Since human capital is embedded in 
people, the increased importance of human capital for the production process implies that 
the ones who posses high levels of human capital and potential for high earning have to 
work long hours to capitalize on that potential. 
As a consequence of these changes in the distribution of who works more hours,
having a paid job, besides the income that it would bring has increased in desirability 
because it improves one’s social status. Thus “busyness” becomes the new “badge of 
honor” (Gershuny 2005). Stay-at-home moms have to defend their choice of not also 
having a career outside the household. Rich heiresses make declarations about how busy 
they are designing purses for a living. Overall, the society frowns upon not being 
involved in paid work and not having an active, goal oriented leisure time. 
We develop a neoclassical general equilibrium model that takes into consideration 
these leisure externalities. In the case of a negative leisure externality (i.e. crowding of 
the leisure facilities like parks and public swimming pools), we show that equilibrium 
consumption, labor and capital are lower than their respective socially optimal 
equilibrium values and therefore equilibrium leisure is too high. In the case of a positive 
leisure externality (i.e. people enjoy leisure more when others do as well) equilibrium 
consumption, labor and capital are shown to be too high and leisure suboptimal.
5We estimate the tax rates necessary to bring the economy to a social optimum. 
We show that the optimal capital tax is equal to 0 and we determine the tax on labor 
income required to rectify the source of distortions. This tax depends on the elasticity of 
individual and average leisure and the consumption tax. The government should tax 
(subsidize) labor income according to whether the leisure externality is positive or 
negative.
We focus on the case when leisure externalities are positive. The higher the effect 
that average leisure has on individual utility, the higher is the tax necessary to bring the 
competitive economy to a social optimum. Imposing this tax leads to significant welfare 
increases both in the short and in the long run. 
We use a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function with different 
degrees of leisure externalities and a Cobb-Douglas production function to calibrate the 
model numerically and analyze the transitional dynamics and implications for welfare 
given by different exogenous shocks to the economy: an increase in the growth rate of 
labor productivity and an increase of the tax on labor income.
The transition paths are sensitive to the presence of leisure externalities both in 
the centrally planned and competitive economy. Even though leisure externalities have no 
impact on the choice of leisure and consumption in the long run in the competitive
economy they affect the transition paths. They reduce the immediate impact that 
productivity and fiscal shocks have on leisure and affect the speed of convergence. The 
presence of leisure externalities has different effects on the speed of convergence in the 
centrally planned and competitive economy. In the centrally planned economy, leisure 
externalities speed up the convergence rate whereas the opposite is true in the
competitive economy.
An increase in the growth rate of labor productivity leads to a permanent increase 
in the equilibrium growth rate, so that quantities per capita grow forever at a higher rate. 
It leads to an immediate decrease in both the investment rate and the equilibrium labor, so 
that the agent enjoys both more leisure and more consumption and thus higher welfare. 
The centrally planned economy where leisure externality is present enjoys the highest 
level of leisure and the smallest relative increase in leisure in the long run.
6An increase in the tax on labor income leads to an increase in leisure as the return 
from labor is affected. Short run welfare increases as the increase in leisure compensates 
for the decrease in consumption. An increase in the labor income tax leads to losses in 
intertemporal welfare when there are no leisure externalities, but has a positive effect in 
the opposite case. 
Even if the agent from the competitive economy does not take into consideration 
the effects of leisure externality when maximizing utility, these effects are apparent ex 
post when the welfare is estimated. Since both the increase in productivity growth and in 
tax on labor income lead to increases in the leisure level in the long run, as leisure 
externalities increase this has a stronger positive influence on welfare. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 sets out the structure 
of the model, outlines the steady-state equilibrium in the competitive and centrally 
planned economy and derives the optimal tax levels. Section 3 characterizes the 
equilibrium dynamics in the competitive and centrally planned economy. Section 4
calibrates the model and considers the numerical effects of an increase in the growth rate 
of labor productivity and an increase in the tax on labor income. Section 5 provides 
concluding remarks, while technical details of the solution are provided in the Appendix
2. The Model
2.1 Representative Consumer
The representative consumer is endowed with one unit of time that can be 
allocated to leisure, il , leaving (1 )il  available for work. The economy is populated by 
N agents, all identical, and the population growth is n. Let lˆ  denote the average leisure in 
the economy ˆ /il l N . In equilibrium since all agents are identical ˆ il l .Agent i owns 
Ki  units of private capital and  iC  is the consumption of the representative household.  
Given the externalities in leisure we assume that the representative agent’s 
welfare depends not only on his own consumption and leisure, but also on the average 
leisure in the economy and is specified by the intertemporal isoelastic utility function:
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ˆmax ( , , ) ti iu C l l e dt


 (1)
The key issue is the externality imposed by average leisure on the well being of the 
individual agent. The household’s utility is positively influenced ( ˆ 0lu  ) if an increase 
in average leisure give one the opportunity to “play” with more people or reduces the 
stigma associated with being a slacker. The average leisure can negatively influenced the 
household’s utility ( ˆ 0lu  ) i.e. due to crowding of leisure amenities. The utility function 
which includes the leisure externalities in this model is similar with specifications 
promoted in the literature devoted to consumption externalities (Gali 1994, Ljungqvist 
and Uhlig 2000, Dupor and Liu 2003, Liu and Turnovsky 2004).  This specification treat 
the utility functions as time separable as opposed to the habit formation models adopted 
by Carroll et al. (1997, 2000), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. 
(2004). The steady state properties of the two models are not very different given that the 
reference stocks converge to stationary models, however the transition dynamics would 
be different. The question whether leisure can be also habit forming is an interesting topic 
that has not been addressed sufficiently in the economic literature even though there are 
some studies dealing with its implications for growth (Gurdgiev 2004, Karayalcin 2003)
We choose the time separable utility function due to the plethora of evidence presented in 
the introduction in which leisure is complementary across individuals at distinct moments 
in time.
We impose that u possess continuous first and second order partial derivatives:
0cu  , 0ccu  , 0lu  , 0llu   and 2 0cc ll clu u u  . Further conditions are imposed on the 
strength of the external leisure effects to ensure that either the externality augments the 
direct effect or if it is offsetting it is dominated by the direct effect. ˆ 0l lu u  , 
ˆ 0ll llu u  and ˆ 0cl clu u  . 
The agent’s objective is to maximize (1) subject to his accumulation equation,
( ,1 ) ( )i i i k i iK F K l n K C     (2)
8where ( ,1 )i iF K l is the production function and K is the depreciation of the capital.
The optimality conditions are:
,c i du  (3a)
, 1l i d lu F  (3b)
,
,
i d
k k
i d
F n
     

(3c)
where ,i d is the shadow value of an additional unit of capital in the competitive
economy. Eq (3a) equates the marginal utility of consumption with the shadow value of 
capital, eq. (3b) equates the marginal utility of leisure with the marginal utility derived 
form the additional output if labor increases by one unit. Finally, eq. (3c) is the standard 
Keynes-Ramsey consumption rule, equating the rate of return on consumption to the rate 
of return on capital.   
2.2 Central planner
In deriving the optimal allocation of resources in the competitive economy, the 
individual agent neglects the effects that her own leisure has on the utility that the others 
derive from their own leisure. Therefore the equilibrium optimum might diverge from the 
socially optimal level. To derive this socially optimal allocation of resources we consider 
a central planner who takes into account the externality imposed by average leisure
when maximizes (1) subject to the budget constraint (2).
The optimality conditions in this case are
,c i cu  (4a)
ˆ , 1l i c ll
u u F   (4b)
,
,
( ) i ck k
i c
F n
     

(4c)
where ,i c is the social shadow value of an additional unit of capital in the economy. The 
interpretation of equations (4a) - (4c) mirrors that of (3a)-(3c) with the comment that (4b) 
reflects the externality imposed by the average leisure on the marginal utility of leisure.   
9Imposing that , , 0i c i d    we can derive the steady state values ,  and i i iK C l  in 
the competitive and the centrally planned economy and the following properties can be 
inferred (Appendix A):
In the case of a negative leisure externality ( ˆ 0lu  ) equilibrium consumption, 
labor and capital are lower than their respective long run equilibrium values and therefore 
equilibrium leisure is too high.
In the case of a positive leisure externality ( ˆ 0lu  ) equilibrium consumption, 
labor and capital are too high and leisure is suboptimal.
Externality in leisure leads to a divergence between the long run competitive 
equilibrium and the socially optimal one. In the following section we derive the taxes that 
the social planner can impose to achieve the first best optimum allocation in the economy 
in a competitive setting. 
2.3 Optimal tax rates
Let k  be the tax rate imposed on the return to capital, w  the tax rate imposed on 
labor income, c  the tax on consumption and Ti lump sum taxes.
Consider again the competitive economy populated by identical agents. The budget 
constraint in this case is  
     (1 ) 1 (1 ) 1i k k i w i c i iK r n K l w C T             (5)
where kr F is the return to capital, 1 lw F  is the labor income and all taxes are 
remitted back to the agent in the form of lump sum taxes Ti.
The individual agent maximizes (1) subject to the budget constraint (5).
The optimality conditions in this case are
, (1 )c i do cu    (6a)
, (1 )l i do wu w   (6b)
,
,
(1 ) i dok k
i do
r n
       

(6c)
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where ,i do is the shadow value of an additional unit of capital in the competitive
economy with taxes. (6a) equates the marginal utility of consumption to the individual’s 
tax adjusted shadow value of wealth, while (6b) equates the marginal utility of leisure to 
its opportunity cost, the after tax real wage, valued at the shadow value of wealth. The 
third equation is the standard Keynes-Ramsey consumption rule, equating the rate of 
return on consumption to the after-tax rate of return on capital. 
The optimal taxes are chosen such that the time path of ,i iK C  and il  are identical in the 
competitive and centrally planned economy. Replicating the dynamic path of the 
centrally planned economy requires , , , ,/ /i c i c i do i do     which implies that , ,i c i do  , 
where   is an arbitrary constant.
Using (4a) and (6a) the optimal tax on consumption can be derived:
, , (1 )   1 constanti c i do c c c           (7a)
Using (4c), (6c) and (7a), the optimal tax on capital income is shown to be zero, in line 
with results of Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985)
0k  (7b)
The key distortion of the model comes from the difference in the willingness to substitute 
consumption for leisure between the competitive and socially optimal economy.  The 
marginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure: 
ˆ
ˆ
( ) if ( )0d cc c
l
l l l
u u
MRS MRS u
u u u
        (7c)
It shows that the agent from the competitive economy undervalues (overvalues) leisure, if 
leisure externalities are positive (negative) and its willingness to substitute consumption 
for leisure is too high (low) relative to the socially desirable level. 
Tax on labor income corrects for this distortion. Using (4b), (6b) and (7a) we estimate it 
to be:
ˆ
1 (1 )lw c
l l
u
u u
    (7d)
It depends on the elasticity of individual leisure, the extent of leisure externalities and the 
consumption tax.
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Tax on consumption and capital are fixed, whereas tax on labor income is time-
varying and converges to a constant level as capital, consumption and labor converge to 
their respective steady state equilibrium values. These results are similar with those from 
the literature analyzing optimal taxation when consumption externalities are present 
(Fisher and Hof 2000, Liu and Turnovsky 2005) with the remark that due to the different 
nature of distortions in their models it is the tax on consumption that is time-varying. 
If there are no leisure externalities then (7c) becomes w c   . Since c  raises the 
price of consumption in terms of leisure, in the absence of leisure externality w moves 
into the opposite direction to correct for this distortion.
Given that the wage tax corrects the distortions from the labor market, 
consumption tax can be set to 0. Then, the government should tax (subsidize) labor 
income according to whether the leisure externality is positive or negative.
3. Dynamics
Externalities lead to a divergence between the long run competitive equilibrium and the 
socially optimal one. They also affect transitional dynamics. We illustrate these 
differences in the context of an exogenous growth model:
1( ,1 ) ( (1 ))i i i i iF K l Y A l K
      (8)
Where labor productivity grows at an exogenous constant rate g (i.e. /A A g ). 
Consider the aggregate production function:   1(1 )i iY NY AN l K     which is 
constant returns to scale in labor and capital and where ; (1 );i i iK NK L NL N l   
Taking percentage changes, assuming that the ratio /K Y  is constant and therefore the 
growth rates of output and capital are equal K Y  , we obtain 
(1 )Y Yg n         which implies that the growth rate of the economy is constant 
and exogenous  Y n g   . (9a)
We define the scale adjusted variables that are constant in steady state:
;i i
K CK C
k c
NA A NA A
    ; 1( ,1 ) (1 )iYYy f k l l k
NA A
        (9b)
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It is also assumed that the government maintains a balanced budget:
(1 )k w cKr N l w C T      (10)
and since the marginal product of capital and labor respectively are
(1 ) i
i
Y
r
K
   and
1
i
i
Y
w
l


the budget constraint can be rewritten in aggregate form as:
kK Y C K   (5’)
To express the dynamics and the difference between the transition paths in the centrally 
planned and competitive economies we use a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
utility function: 
1ˆ ˆ( , , )i i i iu C l l C l l
 

    (11)
where the conditions imposed on the general utility function (1) are reflected in  
(1 ) 1, 0, 1, 0, ( ) 1                . 
Given this utility we can compare the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 
consumption and leisure in the case when leisure externalities are present and when they 
are not:
0 0 1
1
c
c c
cc
u
IES IES
cu
 

    

(12a)
0 1
1 ( )
l
l
ll
u
IES
lu

  
   
 
 and 0
1
1l
IES  
   (12b)
Leisure externalities do not affect the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 
consumption, but they affect intertemporal elasticity of substitution of leisure. Assuming 
that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of both consumption and leisure is less 
than 1, then 0  and 0 0( ) if >(<)0l lIES IES     .  Willingness to shift leisure over 
time is lower (higher) when leisure externalities are positive (negative), and thus the 
speed of adjustment of the economy is lower (higher). 
Substituting in (7c) and remembering (7a) the optimal tax on labor income 
becomes 1 (1 )w c
      and depends on the effect that own leisure and average 
leisure have on the utility of individual consumer and the arbitrary consumption tax. We 
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also note that using the CES utility function the optimal tax on labor income is constant 
over time. Keeping consumption tax, c ,constant, the higher is β (magnitude of leisure 
externalities), the higher is the tax on labor income necessary to bring the competitive
economy to a social optimum.  
 2 (1 ) 0
w
c
    
   
 
The equilibrium dynamics of the competitive economy can be expressed in terms 
of the stationary variables by the following system:
( 1) ( ) (1 )(1 )k k
c l y
g n
c l k
                   

(13a)
k
k y c
n g
k k k
    

(13b)
(1 )
1 (1 )
w
c
c l
y l
  

 
(13c)
Equation (13a) is obtained by taking the time derivative of (6a), combining it with (6c)
and (9b) and noting that (1 )
y
r
k
  . Equation (13b) is the accumulation equation for 
scale-adjusted capital and is obtained by combining (9b) with (5’). Equation (13c) is 
obtained by dividing (6a) by (6b), using the CES utility function (11), the equilibrium 
real wage 
1
yA
w
l


and the scale adjusted variables (9b). It implies that the
consumption to output ratio, given leisure, is increasing with a decrease in the tax on 
labor income and tax on consumption. 
Similarly, the equilibrium dynamics of the centrally planned economy can be 
expressed, using the optimality conditions (4a)–(4c), the budget constraint (5’), the utility 
function (11) and stationary variables (9b) by the following equations:
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( 1) ( ) (1 )k
c l y
g n
c l k
                 

(14a)
k
k y c
n g
k k k
    

(14b)
1
1 ( )
c l
y l
     (14c)
Equation (14c) implies that the consumption to output ratio, given leisure, is increasing 
with a decrease in β.
In Appendix B we show how for both the centrally planned and competitive 
economy, these systems can be reduced to autonomous sets of differential equations in
andk l , which then form the basis for our subsequent numerical work.  These two order 
systems have one sluggish variables, k  and one jump variable, l. We can not solve 
formally these systems of differential equations and we linearize around the steady state 
to derive numerically the time path of leisure, capital and consumption in two cases: as a 
reaction to an exogenous increase in the productivity level g and an exogenous increase 
in the tax on labor income. To yield a well behaved dynamic behavior we require that the 
determinants of the linearized systems are negative, a property that we found to prevail 
over all of our wide-ranging simulations.
4. Numerical analysis of the transition paths
Further insight into the effects of different economic shocks can be obtained by carrying 
out numerical analysis of the model. We begin by characterizing a benchmark economy, 
calibrating the model using the parameters representative of the US economy (Table 1). 
Most of these parameters are standard and non-controversial.
The labor share of income is σ=0.65 and population grows at an annual rate of 
1.5%. The value of γ=-1.5 implies an intertemporal elasticity of substitution in 
consumption of 0.4, consistent with the estimation by Ogaki and Reinhardt (1998). The 
annual depreciation rates δK=0.05 approximate the average depreciation rates for private 
capital for the US during recent years. The elasticity of private leisure 1.75    and the 
rate of time preference ρ=0.04 accord with standard values in the business cycle 
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literature. All these values are well documented, the only parameter for which we do not 
have an estimate is β which represents the effect of average leisure on individual utility. 
In the numerical analysis we focus on positive leisure externalities1. We use β=0 
(no leisure externality) as our benchmark model and choose 1.5   as the magnitude of 
the positive leisure externalities.  Even though we do not have an estimate for the 
magnitude of leisure externalities from the empirical literature, it is plausible that average 
leisure would have a lower effect on individual utility than own leisure. Therefore we 
choose   , lower than the elasticity of private leisure. 
These parameters lead to the benchmark equilibria reported in Table 2.a. and 2.b. 
The models yield a consumption-output ratio of about 0.8, and an output-capital ratio that 
increases from 0.3 to 0.44, as the productivity growth is 2% higher. An increase in the 
productivity rate also leads to an increase in leisure and an increase in the speed of 
convergence as measured by the stable (negative) eigenvalues associated with the linear 
approximation of the dynamic systems in k and l derived in Appendix B. All these values 
are in line with empirical evidence on OECD economies. The central planner from Table 
2.b. incorporates leisure externality in her optimization problem such that when this 
externality is present the leisure ratio increases by 17% (17.43%) when g=2% (0%). 
Taking into consideration the effect of leisure externality in the optimization problem 
leads to significant welfare increases both in the short and in the long run (Table 3). An 
increase in the tax level from 0 to 46.15% which based on the parameters of the model is 
estimated to bring the competitive economy to a social optimum when leisure externality 
is present, would lead to an impressive increase in the short run welfare of about 33% and 
an increase in the intertemporal welfare of about 16%. The optimal tax level depends on 
the elasticity of leisure and the consumption tax, and is independent of the production 
parameters, including the growth rate of labor productivity g. The growth rates of the
economy are independent of policy and leisure externalities and equal 1.5% when the 
growth rate of the productivity of labor is 0, and 3.5% when g is 2%. Leisure externalities 
reduce the instantaneous impact that productivity and fiscal shocks have on leisure. The 
presence of leisure externality has different effects on the speed of convergence in the 
centrally planned and competitive economy. In the competitive economy it slows down 
                                                
1 The evidence given in the introduction favors the idea of positive leisure externalities.
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the convergence rate from 6.69% to 6.42% if g=0 and from 9.73% to 9.3% if g=2%. In 
the centrally planned economy, where the externality effect is incorporated into the 
maximization problem it has the opposite effect, of increasing the convergence rate to 
6.77% for g=0 and 9.87% for g=2%. The intuition for that is provided by the analysis of 
the intertemporal rate of substitution of leisure (12b) and the marginal rate of substitution 
of consumption for leisure (7c). First, from (12b) we note that willingness to shift leisure 
over time is lower when positive leisure externalities are present, and thus the speed of 
adjustment of the economy is lower for both the competitive and centrally planned 
economy. The competitive economy is only affected by this intertemporal rate of 
substitution effect, and thus in the presence of positive leisure externalities slows down 
the convergence rate of this economy. Second, (7c) shows that, in the presence of 
positive leisure externalities, the central planner values leisure more, and its willingness 
to substitute consumption for leisure is lower than if there are no leisure externalities.
Therefore the central planner chooses more leisure and less capital and the economy
reaches its steady state faster. The second effect dominates the first effect in the centrally 
planned case and thus the presence of positive leisure externalities end up increasing the 
convergence rate. As the productivity growth rate, g increases, the speed of convergence 
increases as well2.
In the following sections we will analyze the dynamic response to two shocks: a 
2% increase in the growth rate of productivity of labor and a 10% increase in the tax on 
labor income. 
4.1 Increase in rate of growth of labor productivity
An increase in the growth rate of labor productivity by 2% leads to dramatic structural 
changes in the economy (Table 4.a). The shock leads to a permanent increase in the 
equilibrium growth rate, so that quantities per capita grow forever. After 50 years output 
per capita increase by about 116%, consumption by 123% and capital by 47%. In steady 
                                                
2 The empirical evidence on the rate of convergence is mixed. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992, 1995) 
estimated it at around 2-3% per year, Casselli et al. (1996) at 10%, and Islam (1995) obtains an estimate of 
about 4.7% for non-oil countries and 9.7% for OECD countries. This model’s estimates are therefore 
within the range of values established in the empirical literature.
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state consumption -output ratio increases by 3.15% and output-capital by 46.6% and 
these increases are constant across our different specifications of leisure externality. 
However different degrees of leisure externality affect the transition paths and thus the
long run levels of per capita quantities even in the competitive economy.
An increase in g leads to an immediate decrease in both the investment rate and 
employment. However as income grows at a higher rate the agent can enjoy both more 
leisure and more consumption. Upon impact leisure increases, overshooting its steady 
state level and then decreases such that in the long run leisure increase is about 0.6-1%. 
The immediate effect of an increase in leisure is the decrease in output per capita. 
Upon impact capital growth becomes negative, but recovers as the positive technological 
shock leads to increases in the output growth of 2.3% upon impact and 3.5% in the long 
run. The instantaneous increase in the consumption to output ratio of 12-13.6% 
compensates for the decrease in output such that even in the short run the consumption 
per capita increases.
The presence of leisure externalities reduces the instantaneous increase in leisure 
and per capita consumption for both the centrally planned and competitive economy. In 
the competitive economy the increased accumulation of capital in the initial stages leads 
to higher per capita levels of output, consumption and capital in the long run. In the 
centrally planned economy, the relative long run increases in per capita output, 
consumption, capital and leisure are however lower when leisure externalities are present 
as the initial steady state quantities are different. Figure 1 shows that in the centrally 
planned economy where leisure externality is present, the absolute level of leisure starts 
and stays at the higher level, even though the relative increase in leisure is smaller.  
Table 4.b. shows that such increases in consumption and in leisure lead to 
dramatic increases in the short run welfare varying from 14.49% when leisure 
externalities are not present to 19.49% (15.11%) when leisure externalities are present 
and the economy is competitive (centrally planned). 
The long run increase in consumption and leisure brought by the increase in 
growth rate of labor productivity has evidently significant effects on the long run welfare 
as well. The increase in long run welfare varies from 37% when there are no leisure 
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externalities to  41.2 % (37.2%) when leisure externalities are present and the economy is 
competitive (centrally planned). 
The percent increase in welfare is higher in the competitive case both in the short 
and long run. However as the competitive economy has a non-optimal consumption and 
leisure structure, its initial welfare level is significantly lower than in the centrally 
planned economy. The absolute gains in welfare are lower in the competitive economy 
and its welfare stays below the optimum.
Increase in welfare is higher when leisure externality is present in both the 
centrally planned and competitive economy. Even if the agent from the competitive
economy does not take into consideration the effects of leisure externality when 
maximizing utility these effects are apparent ex post when the welfare is estimated. An 
increase in productivity growth leads to an increase in leisure level which as leisure 
externalities increase will have a stronger positive influence on welfare.
4.2 Increase in tax on labor income w
An increase in the tax on labor income from 0 to 10% leads to an increase in leisure as 
the return from labor is affected. As the supply of labor decreases, the output-capital ratio 
decreases by about 5% and consumption-output ratio increases slightly. The immediate 
increase in consumption-output ratio mitigates some of the effect that the decrease in 
output has on per capita consumption.
Figure 2 shows that the increase in leisure leads to an immediate decrease in the 
growth rate of capital and output which then recover in the long run. Even thought the 
long run growth rates are not affected in the long run, the long transition path assures that 
the steady state levels of output (capital) are about 6.9-7% (6.7-7%) lower than before the 
increase in taxes. If the growth rate of labor productivity is positive, the levels of output, 
capital and consumption increase by about 153% in 50 years. However these levels are 
about 7% lower than they would have been if taxes had not changed.   
In the short run as the increase of about 3.5% in leisure compensates for the 
decrease in consumption there are slight welfare gains of about 1.78 (1.71%) if there are 
no leisure externalities and of about 7.1 (6.96%) when leisure externalities are present for 
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g=0 (2%).  Leisure overshoots its long run level and then slowly decreases such that in 
the long run leisure increases by 3.25% -3.3% depending on the rate of productivity 
growth. In the long run consumption decreases by about 7% relative to the consumption 
level that would have prevailed if taxes had not changed. Thus the intertemporal welfare 
gains are about 4.8% if leisure externalities are present and transform into losses of about 
0.3% if there no externalities to leisure.
The presence of leisure externalities leads to a higher negative jump in per capita 
consumption and has a mitigating effect on the positive jump in leisure. These effects 
lead to an increased accumulation of capital in the initial stages which translates in 
slightly lower decreases in per capita levels of output, consumption and capital after 50 
years. The differences in the transition paths of the economies with and without leisure 
externalities are not very big as the agent from the competitive economy is not aware of 
the effect that its own leisure has on others’ utility. However, from (12b), the willingness 
to shift leisure over time is higher when leisure externalities are present, and therefore the 
speed of adjustment of the economy is lower. Thus even though upon impact the agent 
from the economy with leisure externalities is closer to the steady state it does not reach it 
faster than the agent from the economy without leisure externalities.
In the long run, as the agent ignores leisure externalities, different levels of β do
not affect her choice of consumption and leisure, nor the output level, but they affect her 
welfare. An increase in the labor income tax is ill advised when there are no leisure 
externalities, but has a positive effect on the welfare in the opposite case. 
5. Conclusions
Recent research in the economic literature is concerned with the effects that 
average consumption has on individual consumption. This paper argues that leisure has 
significant externalities as well and develops a neoclassical growth model that 
incorporates these effects. Ignoring the positive (negative) externalities provided by 
leisure leads to equilibrium consumption, labor and capital that are too high (low) and 
leisure that is too low (high). The government should tax (subsidize) labor income if 
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leisure externalities are positive (negative) to rectify the source of distortions. These taxes 
or subsidies depend on the elasticity of individual and average leisure and the 
consumption tax. Imposing them lead to significant welfare increases both in the short 
and in the long run. 
We focus on positive leisure externalities in our numerical analysis. The 
numerical analysis of transitional dynamics and implications for welfare given by 
different exogenous shocks to the economy bring out a series of interesting results. The 
dynamics are sensitive to the presence of leisure externalities even in the competitive 
economy. Leisure externalities reduce the immediate impact that productivity and fiscal 
shocks have on leisure, but have no impact on the magnitude of relative leisure changes 
in the long run. The presence of leisure externality has different effects on the speed of 
convergence in the centrally planned and competitive economy. In the competitive
economy it slows down the convergence rate whereas it has the opposite effect in the 
centrally planned economy
 An increase in the growth rate of labor productivity leads to a permanent increase 
in the equilibrium growth rate, so that quantities per capita grow forever. The adjustment 
processes of key variables in a competitive and centrally planned economy with leisure 
externalities are compared. The agent from the centrally planned economy enjoys the 
highest level of leisure and the smallest relative increase in leisure. Even if the agent from 
the competitive economy does not take into consideration the effects of leisure externality 
when maximizing utility these effects are apparent ex post when the welfare is estimated. 
An increase in productivity growth leads to an increase in the leisure level in the long run 
which as leisure externalities increase has a stronger positive influence on welfare. 
An increase in the tax on labor income leads to an increase in leisure as the return 
from labor is affected. Since the agent ignores leisure externalities, their different levels
do not affect the choice of consumption and leisure, nor the output level in the long run, 
but they affect the overall welfare and the transition paths. An increase in the labor 
income tax leads to losses in intertemporal welfare when there are no leisure externalities, 
but has a positive effect in the opposite case. The presence of leisure externalities 
therefore has profound consequences on the optimal tax level of labor income and the 
measurement of welfare.  
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Appendix A
From (3a)-(3c), the steady state in the competitive economy is characterized by the 
following equations:
* * * *ˆ( , , )c i du C l l 
* * * * * *ˆ( , , ) ( ,1 )l du c l l F k l 
* *( ,1 )k i kF K l n     
* * * *( ,1 ) ( ) 0k i iF k l n K C    
From (4a)-(4c), the steady state in the economy with a central planner that takes into 
consideration the leisure externalities to derive the socially optimal equilibrium is 
characterized by the following equations
,( , , )c i i cu C l l   
ˆ , 1( , , ) ( , , ) ( ,1 )l i i i c l ilu C l l u C l l F K l          
( ,1 ) ( )k i kF K l n     
( ,1 ) ( ) 0i k i iF K l n K C      
In order to compare the values of the variables in the two steady states we construct the 
matrix:
*
ˆ
*
ˆ ˆ1 1 1 1
*
1
*
1
0 1 0
0 0 0
1 0 0
cc cl cl
lc ll l l lk lll l
k l kk
l k k d c
u u u c c
u u u F F F ul l
F F k k
F F n
 
  
   


      
                              




2
ˆ1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 ) 0k lk l cc lk kk l l lk kk l cl l ccclDet F n F F u F F F F F F u u F u                
 ˆ 1 1 ( )c kk l k l k klDet u F F F F n     
ˆ( ) ( )c lSign Det sign u 
*
ˆ( ) ( )lSign c c sign u 
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ˆl kkl
Det u F 
ˆ( ) ( )l lsign Det sign u
*
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ˆ 1k k ll
Det u F  
ˆ( ) ( )k lsign Det sign u 
*
ˆ( ) ( )lsign k k sign u 
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*
ˆ( ) ( )lsign sign u  
Appendix B
The equilibrium dynamics of the competitive economy are expressed in terms of
the stationary variables by the (13a)-(13c).
( 1) ( ) (1 )(1 )k k
c l y
g n
c l k
                   

(13a)
k
k y c
n g
k k k
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
(13b)
(1 )
1 (1 )
w
c
c l
y l
  

 
(13c)
In steady state we impose 0
k l c
k l c
  
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 and we can find out the long run equilibrium 
values of c, k, l and y.
We can not solve formally these systems of differential equations and we linearize 
around the steady state to determine the transitional dynamics:
From (13c)
1 1(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
1 (1 ) (1 )
w w
c c
yl
c l l k
l
       
    
  
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Thus:
 1 1 2(1 ) (1 )(1 ) ( 1) (1 ) 1 ( 1)
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We can express: 
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Linearize around the SS:
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Linearizing this is a little more complex, but in doing so, we evaluate the expression at 
the steady state, where 0k  .  Following this procedure yields:
2
1 ( 1)(1 ) 1 ( 1)(1 )
(1 )(1 ) 11 ( ) (1 )(1 ) 12 ( )
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y y
l a k k a l l
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Centrally planned economy 
The equilibrium dynamics of the centrally planned economy are expressed in 
terms of the stationary variables by the (14a)-(14c)
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In steady state we impose  0
k l c
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 and we can find out the long run equilibrium 
values of c, k, l and y.
We can not solve formally these systems of differential equations and we linearize 
around the steady state to determine the transitional dynamics:
Use (14c) and: 1 1(1 )
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Therefore:
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Linearize around the SS:
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Linearizing this is a little more complex, but in doing so, we evaluate the expression at 
the steady state, where 0l k   .  Following this procedure yields:
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Leisure Externalities: Implications for Growth and Welfare
Tables
Table 1. Base parameter values
Preference and population parameters γ=-1.5, 1.75  , ρ=0.04, n=0.015
Production parameters A(0)=1, σ=0.65, δK=0.05, α=1, g=0
Table 2.a Competitive economy (Base equilibria)
No leisure externality 0   Leisure externality 1.5 
y/k c/y Leisure Growth Optimal
w
Stable 
eigenvalue
y/k c/y Leisure Growth Optimal
w
Stable 
eigenvalue
0%g 
0.3 0.783 0.678 1.5% 0 -0.06691 0.3 0.783 0.678 1.5% 0.4615 -0.0642
2%g 
0.44 0.8 0.685 3.5% 0 -0.097342 0.44 0.8 0.685 3.5% 0.4615 -0.093022
Table 2.b. Centrally planned economy (Base equilibria)
  No leisure externality 0   Leisure externality 1.5 
y/k c/y Leisure Growth Stable 
eigenvalue
y/k c/y Leisure Growth Stable 
eigenvalue
0%g 
0.3 0.783 0.678 1.5% -0.06691 0.3 0.783 0.796 1.5% -0.06775
2%g 
0.44 0.8 0.685 3.5% -0.097342 0.44 0.8 0.801 3.5% -0.0987208
Table 3: Welfare analysis of a move to a socially optimal economy
No leisure externality
0 
Leisure externality 
1.5 
Optimal tax level 0w  46.15w 
SR welfare 0 33.3140%g 
LR welfare 0 16.245
SR welfare 0 32.52452%g 
LR welfare 0 15.8734
Table
Table 4.a. Increase in the rate of technological change g from 0 to 2%
Per capita quantities (change %)
Upon impact After 50 years
iK iC iY l iK iC iY l
0  0 7.07 -5.42 3.9 47.14 123.2 116.21 0.99Competitive
1.5  0 6.51 -5.00 3.6 47.37 123.32 116.32 0.99
0  0 7.07 -5.42 3.9 47.14 123.2 116.21
3
0.99Centrally 
planned
1.5  0 6.25 -6.46 2.49 46.54 122.33 115.38
8
0.62
6
Growth rates themselves  , not percentage changes
Upon impact Steady State
Kˆ Cˆ Yˆ lˆ Kˆ Cˆ Yˆ lˆ
0  -0.9 1.4 2.3 -0.27 3.5 3.5 3.5 0Competitive
1.5  -0.7 1.5 2.3 -0.2 3.5 3.5 3.5 0
0  -0.9 1.4 2.3 -0.27 3.5 3.5 3.5 0Centrally 
planned 1.5  -1.0 1.4 2.4 -0.18 3.5 3.5 3.5 0
Ratios (changes %)
Upon impact Steady State
y/k c/y y/k c/y
0  -5.42939 13.22 47.619 3.15717Competitive
1.5  -5.00827 12.125 47.619 3.15717
0  -5.42939 13.22 47.619 3.15717Centrally 
planned
1.5  -6.46861 13.6027 47.619 3.15717
Table 4.b. Welfare consequences of an increase in the rate of technological change g from 0 
to 2%
No leisure externality
0 
Leisure externality 
1.5 
SR welfare 14.49 19.49Competitive
LR welfare 37.11 41.20
SR welfare 14.49 15.11Centrally 
planned LR welfare 37.11 37.178
Table 5.a. Increase in tax on labor income w  from 0 to 10%
Per capita quantities (change %)
Upon impact After 50 years
iK iC iY l iK iC iY l
0  0 -4.23 -4.92 3.54 -6.76 -6.91 -6.93 3.330%g 
1.5  0 -4.2787 -4.89 3.52 -6.73 -6.9 -6.92 3.33
0  0 -4.23 -5.01 3.5 152.7 152.6 152.6 3.252%g 
1.5  0 -4.27 -4.98 3.47 152.7 152.6 152.6 3.25
Growth rates themselves  , not percentage changes
Upon impact Steady State
Kˆ Cˆ Yˆ lˆ Kˆ Cˆ Yˆ lˆ
0  1.02 1.308 1.35 -.014 1.5 1.5 1.5 00%g 
1.5  1.045 1.31822 1.36 -.012 1.5 1.5 1.5 0
0  2.8 3.21 3.29 -0.02 1.5 1.5 1.5 02%g 
1.5  2.8 3.22 3.29 -0.02 3.5 3.5 3.5 0
Ratios (changes %)
Upon impact Steady State
y/k c/y y/k c/y
0  -4.95 0.72 0 00%g 
1.5  -4.89333 0.646253 0 0
0  -5.01 0.82 0 02%g 
1.5  -4.98 0.74 0 0
Table 5.b. Welfare effects of an increase in tax on labor income w   from 0 to 10%
No leisure externality
0 
Leisure externality 
1.5 
SR welfare 1.7800 7.119280%g 
LR welfare -0.283649 4.8455
SR welfare 1.71223 6.969752%g 
LR welfare -0.299298 4.74782
 Figure 1: Transitional dynamics after an increase in the rate of technological change 
g from 0 to 2%. Comparison of the centrally planned vs. competitive economy in the 
presence of leisure externalities (β=1.5)  
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 Figure 2. Transitional dynamics after an increase in tax on labor income wτ  from 0 
to 10%. Comparative analysis with leisure and no leisure externalities 
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